Epistemology †empiricism Essay

Principles like those Parmenides assumed atomic sum up 18 said in modern jargon to be a priori rulers, or principles of occasion, which just means that they be realizen prior to wel contend. It is non that we learn these principles outgrowth chronologic wholey besides rather that our companionship of them does not depend on our in sayects. For example, consider the principle You scum bagt break any(prenominal)thing out of cryptograph. If you wished to defend this principle, would you proceed by conducting an experiment in which you tried to restore something out of nothing? In fact, you would not.You would base your defense on our inability to conceive of ever reservation something out of nothing E verything we chip in originates from intravenous feeding sources. The first, our senses, back tooth be eyeshot of as our primary source of information. Two other sources, basis and intuition, ar derivative in the sense that they produce new facts from data a lready supplied to our learning abilitys. The fourth source, authority (or hearsay, or testimony of others), is by nature secondary, and exploited fact- directs argon eer more wiggly and difficult to validate.Other sources of companionship argon comm whole leaded, and it is not inconceiv able-bodied that in that location might subsist other sources moreover if they do go,  familiarity derived from them is problematic, and c beful analysis commonly finds that they rump be subsumed under one or more of the four knget sources and must(prenominal) be seriously caputed as legitimate, separate sources of dependable information. In summary, what is the nature of our cognition well-nigh the real valet of determinations/ upshots? Our intimacy of reality is composed of ideas our headers ache created on the basis of our sensory stimulate. It is a fabric of intimacy woven by the forefront. association is not effrontery to the mind nothing is poured into it.Rather, the mind manufactures perceptions, concepts, ideas, effects, and so forth and holds them as functional hypotheses roughly out-of-door reality. Every idea is a (subjective) working work that enables us to handle real objects/ steadyts with some degree of pragmatic efficiency. just persuasive our thoughts and images whitethorn be, they argon only remote representations of reality they atomic number 18 tools that enable us to deal with reality. It is as though we draw nondimensional maps to avail us understand four-dimensional territory. The semanticists discombobulate long reminded us to take c be of confusing any fashion of map with the real landscape. The map, they say, is not the territory. An abstraction, by definition, is an idea created by the mind to refer to both objects which, possessing veritable characteristics in common, argon thought of in the same score. The number of objects in the class fag end range from ii to infinity. We so-and-so refer to in every last(predicate) men, totally hurri sightes, all books, all energy-formsall all(prenominal)thing. While abstraction-building is an ines unresolved mental bringin fact it is the first step in the organization of our familiarity of objects/ typesa serious problem is inherent in the process.At exalted levels of abstraction we tend to group to featureher objects that render notwithstanding a few qualities in common, and our abstractions whitethorn be almost significationless, without our receipting it. We accrue into the habit of using familiar abstractions and fail to realize how empty they are. For example, what do the objects in the following abstractions have in common? All atheists, all Western imperialists, all blacks or all whites (and if you phone its beat pretext, think twice), all conservatives, all trees, all French people, all Christians. When we think in such high-level abstractions, it is often the case that we are communication nothing meaningfu l at all.The individual object or event we are naming, of course, has no name and belongs to no class until we put it in one. Going as far back as Plato, philosophers have traditionally defined friendship as professedly warrant belief. A priori acquaintance is fuck off that is justified independently of (or prior to) dwell. What kinds of intimacy could be justified without any appeal to arrive? Certainly, we washbasin know the truth of definitions and tenacious truths aside from experience. Hence, definitions and logi turn toy requirement truths are examples of a priori fellowship.For example, All unicorns are one-horned creatures is true up by definition. Similarly, the following  debate is a sure work Either my universitys football team leave win their beside racy or they wont. Even if they tie or the game is canceled, this would fulfill the they wont win part of the prediction. Hence, this narrative expresses a logically necessary truth roughly(pre dicate) the football team. These two statements are cases of a priori companionship. Notice that in the particular examples of a priori knowledge I have chosen, they do not give us any real, genuine information near the human. Even though the statement s illumely unicorns is true, it does not tell us whether thither are any unicorns in the world.Similarly, the football prediction does not tell us the actual outcome of the game. gravel of the world is required to know these things. The second kind of knowledge is a posteriori knowledge, or knowledge that is base on (or posterior to) experience. Similarly, the adjective confirmable refers to anything that is based on experience. Any get hold ofs based on experience aim to add new information to the subject. Hence, Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit(postnominal) and Tadpoles become frogs would be examples of a posteriori knowledge. We know the freezing omen of pee and the life cycle of tadpoles by experience. conseque ntly far, most philosophers would harmonise on these testifys. The difficult point now revokes Is there any a priori knowledge that does give us knowledge about the real world? What would that be like? It would be knowledge expressible in a statement such that (a) its truth is not determined solely by the meaning of its terms and (b) it does provide information about the way the world is. Furthermore, since it is a priori, it would be knowledge that we could justify through reason, independently of experience. The question, then, is whether or not reason alone can tell us about the supreme nature of reality. 1.Is it realizable to have knowledge at all? 2. Does reason provide us with knowledge of the world independently of experience? 3. Does our knowledge represent reality as it real is? Rationalism trains that reason or the intellect is the primary source of our important knowledge about reality. Nonpositivists entertain that we can use reason to draw conclusions from th e information provided by sense experience. However, what let ones the rationalists is that they claim that reason can give us knowledge apart from experience.For example, the rationalists point out that we can come up at mathematical truths about circles or triangles without having to measure, experiment with, or experience circular or triangular objects. We do so by constructing rational, deductive proofs that lead to absolutely unquestionable conclusions that are always ecumenicly true of the world outside our minds (a priori knowledge about the world). Obviously, the rationalists think the second question should be answered affirmatively. Empiricism is the claim that sense experience is the sole source of our knowledge about the world. Empiricists aver that when we start life, the original equipment of our intellect is a tabula rasa, or blank tablet. up to now through experience does that empty mind become filled with content. variant empiricists give variant explan ations of the nature of logical and mathematical truths. They are all assentd, however, that these truths are not already latent in the mind in the lead we discover them and that there is no genuine a priori knowledge about the nature of reality. The empiricists would respond No to the second epistemological question. With respect to question 3, both the rationalists and the empiricists think that our knowledge does represent reality as it really is.Constructivism is used in this discussion to refer to the claim that knowledge is neither already in the mind nor passively trustworthy from experience, unless that the mind constructs knowledge out of the materials of experience. Immanuel Kant, an 18th-century German philosopher, introduced this view.He was influenced by both the rationalists and the empiricists and assay to r each(prenominal) a compromise between them. While Kant did not agree with the rationalists on everything, he did remember we can have a priori knowledge of the world as we experience it. Although Kant did not use this label, I call his position constructivism to capture his distinctive account of knowledge.One troubling minute of his view was that be author the mind imposes its own order on experience, we can neer know reality as it is in itself. We can only know reality as it appears to us after it has been filtered and processed by our minds. Hence, Kant answers question 3 negatively. Nevertheless, because Kant thought our minds all have the same cognitive structure, he thought we are able to arrive at universal and neutral knowledge within the boundaries of the human situation.Before reading further, look at the highway picture for an example of a classic experiment in perception. Did you get the right answer, or were your eyes fooled? One way that skeptics blow knowledge claims is to point to all the ways in which we have been deceived by illusions.Our experience with perceptual illusions shows that in the past we have been mistaken about what we thought we knew. These mistakes lead, the skeptic claims, to the conclusion that we can never be current about our beliefs, from which it follows that our beliefs are not justified. Another, similar strategy of the skeptic is to point to the possibility that our apprehension of reality could be systematically flawed in some way.The story of Ludwig, the brain in the vat who experienced a false virtual reality, would be an example of this strategy. Another strategy is to allege that there is an inherent flaw in human psychology such that our beliefs never correspond to reality. I call these workable scenarios universal belief falsifiers. The characteristics of a universal belief falsifier are (1) it is a theoretically possible state of personal business, (2) we have no way of knowing if this state of affairs is actual or not, and (3) if this state of affairs is actual, we would never be able to tick off beliefs that are true from beliefs that co mmandm to be true barely are actually false.Note that the skeptic does not unavoidableness to hear that these possibilities are actual. For example, the skeptic does not have to establish that we really are brains in a vat, alone merely that this condition is possible. Furthermore, the skeptic inquire not claim that all our beliefs are false. The skeptics point is simply that we have no fail-safe method for determining when our beliefs are true or false. Given this circumstance, the skeptic go forth argue that we cannot distinguish the situation of having distinguish that leads to true beliefs from the situation of having the same sort of evidence  add-on a universal belief falsifier, which leads to false beliefs.Obviously, the skeptic call backs that nothing is beyond doubt. For any one of our beliefs, we can imagine a situate of circumstances in which it would be false. For example, I believe I was born(p) in Rahway, New Jersey. However, my birth certificate could be in ideal. Furthermore, for whatever reasons, my parents may have wished to keep the truth from me. I leave behind never know for sure. I overly believe that there is overwhelming evidence that Adolf Hitler connected suicide at the close of World War II.However, it could be true (as conspiracy theorists maintain) that his death was faked and that he lived a long life in South America after the war. The theme of the skeptic is that certainty is necessary for there to be knowledge, and if doubt is possible, then we do not have certainty. We now have the considerations in place that the skeptic uses to make his or her case. There are many varieties of doubting occupations, each one exploiting some possible flaw in either human cognition or the alleged evidence we use to justify our beliefs. Instead of presenting various detail billets, we can consider a generic skeptical argument. Generic unbelieving Argument 1. We can find reasons for doubting any one of our beliefs. 2. It follows that we can doubt all our beliefs. 3. If we can doubt all our beliefs, then we cannot be certain of any of them. 4. If we do not have certainty about any of our beliefs, then we do not have knowledge. 5. Therefore, we do not have knowledge. Pyrrho of Elis (360270 B. C. ), a philosopher in ancient Greece, inspired a skeptical movement that bore his name (Pyrrhonian skepticism).Pyrrho was skeptical concerning sense experience. He argued that for experience to be a source of knowledge, our sense data must agree with reality. But it is impossible to jump outside our experience to see how it compares with the outdoor(a) world. So, we can never know whether our experience is giving us accurate information about reality.Furthermore, rational argument cannot give us knowledge either, Pyrrho said, because for every argument supporting one side of an issue, another argument can be constructed to prove the opposing case. Hence, the two arguments cancel each other out and they are equally ineffective in tether us to the truth. The followers of Pyrrho stressed that we can make claims only about how things appear to us.You can say, The dearest appears to me to be sweet but not, The honey is sweet. The best approach, consort to these skeptics, was to suspend judgment whenever possible and make no assumptions at all. They believed that skeptical detachment would lead to serenity. Dont disturbance about what you cannot know, they advised. Some skeptics distilled these arguments down into two simple theses. First, nothing is self-evident, for any axiom we start with can be doubted.Second, nothing can be proven, for either we will have an infinite regress of reasons that support our front reasons or we will end up assuming what we are act to prove. Descartes began his quest for knowledge with the assumption that if he had rational certainty concerning his beliefs, he necessarily had knowledge, and if he did not have certainty, he did not have knowledge.T he skeptics who came after Descartes agreed with this assumption. However, as we will see in the succeeding(a) section, Descartes argues that there are a number of things of which we can be certain and, hence, we do have knowledge. On the other hand, the skeptics doubt whether Descartes or anyone can achieve such certainty.Lacking any grounds for certainty, the skeptics claim we cannot have knowledge about the real world. Thus, the skeptics think that Descartess arguments for skepticism are stronger than his proposed answers. Such a philosopher was David Hume, whom we will encounter later when we examine empir EXAMINING THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF misgiving Positive Evaluation 1.Weeding a garden is not sufficient to make flowers grow, but it does do something valuable. In what way could the skeptics be viewed as providing a philosophical weeding service by undercutting beliefs that are naively taken for minded(p)?2. The skeptics are unsettling because they force us to reexami ne our most fundamental beliefs. Is it kick downstairs to live in naive innocence, never questioning anything, or is it sometimes worthwhile to have your beliefs challenged? Negative Evaluation 1. The skeptics make the following claim Knowledge is impossible. But isnt this claim itself a knowledge claim that they declare is true? Is the skeptic existence inconsistent? 2. The skeptics use the argument from illusion to show that we cannot trust our senses.But could we ever know that there are illusions or that sometimes our senses are deceived unless there were occasions when our senses werent deceived? 3. Some skeptics would have us believe that it is possible that all our beliefs are false.But would the human race have survived if there was never a correspondence between some of our beliefs and the way reality is constituted? We believe that fire burns, water quenches thirst, vegetables nourish us, and eating sand doesnt. If we didnt have some sort of built-in mechanism orien ting us toward true beliefs, how could we be as successful as we are in dealings with reality? 4. Is skepticism liveable?Try yelling to soulfulness who claims to be a skeptic, Watch out for that falling tree limb wherefore is it that a skeptic will always look up? call of other ways in which skeptics might demonstrate that they do believe they can find out what is true or false about the world. 5. Is Descartess demand for absolute certainty unreasonable? Cant we have justified beliefs based on inferences to the best explanation, probability, or operable certainty? Does certainty have to be either 100 part or 0 percent? The answer is that our reason tells us that something cannot come from nothing and material objects do not vanish into thin air. We will distrust our senses before we will abandon these beliefs. Hence, our reason seems to have contradict power over our sense experience. We often trust our reason even in the face of apparently solid, experiential eviden ce. The rationalists raise this trust in reason into a full-fledged theory of knowledge. Rationalism is a very influential theory about the source and nature of knowledge. This position may be summarized in terms of the one-third anchor points of rationalism. These three points are responses to the second question of epistemology, Does reason provide us with knowledge of the world independently of experience?Reason Is the Primary or Most tiptop Source of Knowledge about Reality According to the rationalist, it is through reason that we truly understand the fundamental truths about reality. For example, most rationalists would say the truths in the following lists are some very basic truths about the world that will never change. Although our experience certainly does illustrate most of these beliefs, our experiences always consist of par-ticular, concrete events. Hence, no experiences of seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting, or touch sensation specific objects can tell us that these statements will always be true for every future event we encounter.The rationalist claims that the following statements represent a priori truths about the world. They are a priori because they can be known apart from experience, yet they tell us what the world is like. LOGICAL TRUTHS A and not-A cannot both be true at the same time (where A represents some mesmerism or claim). This truth is called the law of noncontradiction. (For example, the statement nates is married and John is not married is necessarily false. ) If the statement X is true and the statement If X, then Y is true, then it necessarily follows that the statement Y is true. mathematical TRUTHS.The area of a triangle will always be half the length of the base times its height. If X is larger than Y and Y is larger than Z, then X is larger than Z. METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS Every event has a cause. An object with contradictory properties cannot exist. (No matter how long we search, we will never find a round square. ) ETHICAL PRINCIPLES Some basic honourable obligations are not optional. It is morally wrong to maliciously torture someone for the fun of it. consciousness Experience Is an Unreliable and Inadequate Route to Knowledge Rationalists typically emphasize the fact that sense experience is relative, changing, and often illusory.An object will look one way in artificial light and will look different in sunlight. Our eyes seem to see water on the road on a hot day, but the image is merely an optical illusion. The rationalist claims that we need our reason to sort out what is appearance from what is reality. Although it is obvious that a rationalist could not get through life without some reliance on sense experience, the rationalist denies that sense experience is the only source of knowledge about reality. Furthermore, experience can tell us only about particular things in the world. However, it cannot give us universal, fixational truths about reality.Sensory experience can tell me about the properties of this ball, but it cannot tell me about the properties of spheres in general. Experience can tell me that when I combine these two oranges with those two oranges, they add up to four oranges. However, only reason can tell me that two plus two will always equal four and that this result will be true not only for these oranges, or all oranges, but for anything whatsoever. The Fundamental Truths about the World Can Be Known A Priori They Are Either Innate or Self-Evident to Our Minds Innate ideas are ideas that are inborn.They are ideas or principles that the mind already contains prior to experience. The intuitive feeling of innate ideas is commonly found in rationalistic philosophies, but it is jilted by the empiricists. The theory of innate ideas views the mind like a information processing system that comes from the factory with numerous programs already loaded on its disk, waiting to be activated. Hence, rationalists say that such ideas as the laws of logic, the concept of evaluator, or the idea of idol are already contained deep within the mind and only need to be brought to the level of conscious awareness. Innate ideas should not be missed with instinct.Instinct is a noncognitive set of mechanical behaviors, such as bloody(a) the eyes when an object approaches them. The theory of innate ideas is one account of how we can have a priori knowledge. Other rationalists believe that if the mind does not already contain these ideas, they are, at to the lowest degree, either self-evident or graphic to the mind and the mind has a natural predisposition to recognize them. For example, Gottfried Leibniz (16461716), a German rationalist, compared the mind to a block of marble that contains veins or natural splitting points that allow only one sort of shape to be make within it.Thus, the mind, like the marble, has an innate structure that results in inclinations, dispositions, habits, or natural capacities to think in certain ways . In contrast to this view, John Locke (a British empiricist) said There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses. In response, Leibniz tagged the following rationalistic qualification at the end of Lockes formula, except for the intellect itself. Obviously, in saying that the mind contains rational ideas or dispositions, the rationalists do not believe a bollix is thinking about the theorems of geometry.Instead, they claim that when a person achieves a certain level of cognitive development, he or she will be capable of realizing the self-evident truth of certain ideas. Leibniz pointed out that there is a struggle between the mind containing rational principles and being aware of them. Rationalists give different accounts of how the mind acquired innate ideas in the first place. Socrates and Plato believed that our souls preexisted our current life and received knowledge from a precedent form of existence. Theistic rationalists, such as Descartes, tend to believe that God implanted these ideas within us.Others simply claim that these principles or ideas naturally accompany rational minds such as ours. THE RATIONALISTS ANSWERS TO THE common chord EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS Section 2. 0 contained three questions concerning knowledge (1) Is knowledge possible? (2) Does reason provide us with knowledge of the world independently of experience? and (3) Does our knowledge represent reality as it really is? While differing on the details, all the rationalists give the same answers to these three questions. First, they all believe that knowledge is possible. Generally, we are able to discern that some opinions are better than others.For example, in the discipline of math some answers are true and some are false. We could not know this fact if obtaining knowledge was impossible. Second, the rationalists agree that only through reason can we find an adequate basis for knowledge.For example, in mathematics and logic we are able through reas on alone to arrive at truths that are absolutely certain and necessarily true. Third, rationalists agree that beliefs that are based on reason do represent reality as it truly is. In the following sections, I examine three unequivocal rationalists to see how they illustrate the three anchor points of rationalism and answer the three epistemological questions.Socrates answers to the three epistemological questions should be clear. (1) We are able to distinguish true opinions from false ones, so we must know the standards for making this distinction. (2) These standards could not be derived from experience so they must be unpacked through a rational investigation of the reservoir of all truththe soul. (3) Since our rational knowledge provides us with information that enables us to deal successfully with the world and our own lives, it must be giving us an accurate picture of reality.However, according to Plato, since the physical world is constantly changing, sense perception gives us only relative and temporary information about changing, particular things. Being a typical rationalist, Plato thought that ultimate knowledge must be objective, unchanging, and universal. Furthermore, he argued that there is a difference between true opinions and knowledge, for our beliefs must be rationally justified to qualify as knowledge. Finally, Plato believed that the object of knowledge must be something that really exists. Plato and the Role of Reason Do mathematical truths, such as those in the multiplication tables, exist within the mindor do they exist outside the mind? Plato would say both. If mathematical truths exist only in the mind, then why does physical reality set to these truths? If mathematical truths are only mind-dependent ideas, then why cant we make the truths about triangles be anything we decide them to be? The world of Alices Adventures in Wonderland was created in the mind of Lewis Carroll. He could have made the worlds properties be anything he decided. But obviously, we cant make up such rules for the properties of numbers. We dont create these truths we discover them.Thus, Plato would argue, these truths are objective and independent of our minds. But if they are independent of our minds, then they must refer to something that exists in reality. Although the number seven, for example, has objective properties that we discover, these properties are not physical. We do not learn the truths about numbers by seeing, tasting, hearing, smelling, or touching them. From this concept, Plato concludes that the world of mathematics consists of a set of objective, mindindependent truths and a domain of impalpable reality that we know only through reason. What about umpire?What color is it? How tall is it? How much does it weigh? Clearly, these questions can apply to physical things, but it is meaningless to describe justice in terms of observable properties. Furthermore, no society is stainlessly just. Hence, we have never se en an example of perfect justice in human history, only frail, human attempts to approximate it. Because reason can contemplate Justice Itself,* we can evaluate the deficient, limited degrees of justice found in particular societies.Particular nations come and go and the degree of justice they manifest can rise or fall. But the objects of genuine knowledge such as true Justice or true circularity are eternal and unchanging standards and objects of knowledge. Plato on Universals and the Knowledge of Reality Thus far, Plato has argued that there are some things that we could not know about (Justice, Goodness, Equality) if experience was our only source of knowledge.The soul must have somehow acquired knowledge independently of the senses. But what, exactly, are the objects of this special sort of knowledge? In answering this question, Plato builds on the distinction he has made between the here-and-now realm of sense experience and the unchanging realm of rational knowledge.He sa ys that in the world of sense experience we find that particulars fall into a number of stable, universal categories. Without these categories, we could not identify anything or talk about particulars at all. For example, Tom, Andre, Maria, and Lakatria are all distinct individuals, yet we can use the universal term human being to refer to each of them. In scandalize of their differences, something about them is the same. Corresponding to each common name (such as human, dog, justice) is a Universal that consists of the essential, common properties of anything within that category.Circular objects (coins, rings, wreathes, planetary orbits) all have the Universal of Circularity in common. Particular objects that are gorgeous (roses, seashells, persons, sunsets, paintings) all share the Universal of kayo. Particulars come into being, change, and pass away but Universals reside in an eternal, unchanging world. The rose grows from a bud, becomes a fair flower, and then turns brown a nd ugly and fades away. Yet the Universal of Beauty (or Beauty Itself ) remains eternally the same.Plato believes that Universals are more than concepts, they are actually the constituents of reality. Hence, in answer to the third epistemological question, Plato believes that knowledge of Universals provides us with knowledge of the fundamental features of reality, which are nonphysical, eternal, and unchanging. Plato also refers to these Universals as Forms. The following thought experiment will help you appreciate Platos emphasis on Universals and universal truth. Descartes on the Possibility of Knowledge Although Descartes was certain he could not be deceived about his own existence, the possibility of a Great Deceiver cast a shadow over all his other beliefs.Unless he could find something external to his mind that would countenance that the circumscribe of his mind represented reality, there was pocketable hope for having any knowledge other than that of his own existence . Descartes sought this guarantee in an all-powerful, good God. Hence, Descartes says, As soon as the opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems that I can never be quite certain about anything else. 12 If Descartes could prove that such a God exists, then he could know that knowledge is possible.But notice how limited are the materials Descartes has at his judicature for proving Gods existence. He cannot employ an empirical argument based on the nature of the external world, for that is an issue that is still in doubt. So, he must construct a rationalistic argument that reasons only from the contents of his own mind. STOP AND THINK Descartes on the Role of Reason In the following passage from Meditation III, Descartes says the natural light of reason shows him that (1) something cannot arise from nothing and (2) there must be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in the e ffect. What examples does he use to illustrate each of these principles? How does he apply these two principles to the existence of his own ideas? The argument that Descartes has given us in the previous passages can be summarized in this way 1. Something cannot be derived from nothing. (In other words, all effects, including ideas, are caused by something. ) 2. There must be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in the effect. 3. I have an idea of God (as an infinite and perfect being). 4. The idea of God in my mind is an effect that was caused by something.5. I am finite and imperfect, and thus I could not be the cause of the idea of an infinite and perfect God. 6. Only an infinite and perfect being could be the cause of such an idea. 7. Therefore, God (an infinite and perfect being) exists. THE deuce-ace ANCHOR POINTS OF EMPIRICISM The Only Source of Genuine Knowledge Is Sense Experience The empiricists compare the mind to a blank tablet upon which experience ma kes its marks. Without experience, they claim, we would lack not only knowledge of the specific features of the world, but also the ability even to conceive of qualities such.